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Abstract
This paper studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely
repeated principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. We show
that the principal, when she obtains a private subjective signal about
the agent’s performance, may pay discretionary bonuses to provide
credible feedback to the agent. Conistent with the often observed
compression of ratings, we show that in equilibrium the principal com-
municates the agent’s interim performance imperfectly, i.e. she does
not fully diﬀerentiate good and bad performance. Furthermore, we
show that small rewards can have a large impact on the agent’s ef-
fort provided that the principal’s stake in the project is small. Our
analysis further reveals that, also in accordance with the empirical
findings, the principal may ex ante prefer to choose a ’smoky’, rather
than a fully transparent performance monitoring system, thereby ac-
quiring an implicit commitment device to reward the agent through
discretionary bonuses.
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1 Introduction
Incentive problems are part of most interpersonal relationships. Much of the
literature on incentive contracts has focused on how verifiable performance
measures can be used to mitigate these problems. But most people do not
work in jobs where verifiable performance measures are available for all im-
portant dimensions of performance (Prendergast, 1999), and many aspects of
their work are not desribed by explicit contracts. Instead, many firms use ex-
tensively discretionary rewards that are based on subjective, non-contractible
performance measures.
In this paper we study how the principal can use a subjective performance
measure to motivate the agent. Despite the non-contractibility, we show that
the principal may have an incentive to oﬀer discretionary rewards in a finitely
repeated game. This happens because the principal has private information
on the worker’s performance, and, if the information is favorable, wants to
comunicate this credibly to the agent to boost his incentives. Since the
principal is tempted to overstate the agent’s performance, cheap talk would
be ineﬀective in this situation.1 Thus, the rewards are used to ensure the
credibility of the interim feedback given to the agent.
We show that a bonus gives positive feedback about past performance to
the agent, and increases his motivation to exert eﬀort in the future. This
result, establishing the informational content of a reward, is in line with the
literature on motivation both in psychology and economics (see e.g. Deci
and Ryan (1985) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2003)). One of our main results,
saying that larger bonuses correspond to higher performance levels comes,
probably, with little surprise. However, we also show that in equilibrium the
bonus is proportional to the principal’s payoﬀ from the project’s success. An
interesting implication of this is that even a small, insignificant bonus can
have a substantial eﬀect on the agent’s subsequent motivation.
We also explore whether ex ante the principal prefers to choose a per-
formance measurement system that is purely transparent to the agent, or
”smoky”, assuming that in both cases performance cannot be observed by a
third party and thus cannot be part of a formal contract. We show that in
some circumstances the principal may choose the smoky performance mea-
surement system, thus gaining an indirect commitment to reward the agent
for successful performance. This finding can explain why firms often use
monitoring systems that provide little information to the agent about per-
formance, even when more informative performance measures are available
1One can check that only the babbling, uninformative equilibrium would be possible if
costly signalling were replaced by a cheap talk game in our model.
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(Gibbs, 1991). The reasoning behind it is that private information of the
principal ensures a positive interim bonus in equilibrium. By contrast, if
the agent could perfectly observe performance, there would be no reason to
provide feedback, and the principal could not credibly commit to paying a
bonus.
Our model furthermore predicts that good performance is not fully sep-
arated from bad performance by the principal. This result provides a new
insight into the reluctance of managers to rate workers diﬀerently. That is,
unsuccessful agents are sometimes given the same bonus as successful ones.
The resulting compression of rating of performance is well documented in
the literature (Prendergast (1999)). Intuitively, if the agent takes a bonus as
providing positive feedback on performance, the principal is tempted to oﬀer
the bonus even after bad performance in order not to demotivate the agent.
The driving assumption behind these results is that the principal has
private information about the agent’s performance. The widespread use of
performance feedback systems shows the relevance of this assumption (cf.
Gibbs (1991)). It seems especially relevant when workers are in their learning
phase, produce a complex good, or contribute to a project that involves many
individual tasks. In such cases, the experience and overview might enable
the manager to form a better judgement of an employee’s performance.
Our model is closely related to that of Be´nabou and Tirole (2003). Unlike
our model, they assume that, at the ex ante stage, the principal has private
information about the task (or about the agent himself), and show that re-
wards have informational content. More precisely, they find that a promise of
a higher bonus by the principal sends a negative signal to the agent, whereas
in our set-up a high bonus provides positive feedback. One crucial diﬀerence
is that Be´nabou and Tirole focus on objective performance measures, rather
than subjective, which implies that bonuses are contractible. By oﬀering a
high bonus, the principal reveals her low confidence in the agent, hence the
negative feedback result. In our case, the principal cannot commit to a con-
tract and, ex post, has higher incentives to give a reward if she can motivate
the agent for the next period, that is, if it gives positive feedback.
The existing literature on subjective performance measures is mostly fo-
cussed on infinitely repeated games (e.g. MacLeod and Malcomson (1989);
Levin (2003)).2 In that setup, noncontractible bonuses occur in equilibrium
through, for instance, the threat of termination of the relationship. Dis-
cretionary bonuses then become self-enforcing. Given that such reputation
mechanisms are relatively well understood, we focus on a finitely repeated
game. In this case, no self-enforcing discretionary bonus based on reputation
2See also Bull (1987), Baker et al. (1994), Pearce and Stacchetti (1998).
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can exist in equilibrium.
Several other papers study subjective performance measures in finitely
repeated games. MacLeod (2003) studies a one-shot game where there is
no balanced budget between what the principal gives as a bonus and what
the agent receives. This ’no balanced budget’ condition allows for a positive
equilibrium bonus. For instance, the principal could commit to a fixed bonus
that may be paid to the agent or a third party. The principal can promise
to reward the agent after good performance, and to give the bonus away to
a third party after bad performance (’burn the money’). Given the com-
mitment to paying a bonus, after a success the principal has no incentive to
renege on giving it to the agent. Actual examples of such burning of money
do exist (see Fuchs (2005)), but it is unclear how important this practice is
in reality. We study the situation in which the budget is balanced.
The role of bonus as a feedback mechanism is also studied in Lizzeri,
Meyer and Persico (2003) and Fuchs (2005). In both papers it is assumed that
the principal has private information on performance. However, both papers
draw no link between the bonus and the information about ability. Lizzeri
et. al. (2003) assume that there is no link between ability and performance.
Interestingly, they also find that the principal may want to hide information
but for other reasons. The trade-oﬀ in their paper is between giving better
incentives by providing better information and a higher wage bill. Also,
they assume that output is verifiable at the end of the last period so that
ultimately performance is objectively measurable. In the model by Fuchs
(2005) there is no diﬀerentiation in abilities among agents, so the bonus gives
no feedback on the ability of the agent. This excludes a positive equilibrium
bonus in the finitely repeated version of his model with a balanced budget.
Finally, there is a strand of literature that explains the use of discre-
tionary bonuses by virtue of social preferences. For instance, Fehr, Ga¨chter,
and Kirchsteiger (1997) argue that, where explicit contracts are absent, re-
ciprocal behavior by agents can serve as a contract enforcement device. If the
principal is motivated by reciprocity, she might reward the agent for good
performance even if there are no enforceable contractual obligations to do so.
Note that this approach is quite diﬀerent from ours, in that it assumes that
agents do not have purely selfish preferences, whereas we focus on the role
of information. In our view, the two approaches are complementary.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and discusses the main assumptions. In section 3 the equilibria are derived.
Section 4 explores the principal’s incentives to choose a transparent or a
”smoky” monitoring system. Section 5 compares our results to the literature
on ”hidden costs of rewards”. In section 6 we briefly discuss the modification
of our results to more general variants of our framework. Finally, section 7
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concludes and suggests possible extensions.
2 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a two-period principal-agent relationship, in which both parties
are risk-neutral. The agent is facing a sequence of two identical projects and,
at the beginning of each period t = 1, 2, he decides whether to exert eﬀort
or not: et ∈ {0, 1}. The agent’s cost c(e) of eﬀort is increasing; we normalize
c(0) = 0 and c(1) = c.
The agent is characterized by his ability to perform the task, θ, that can
be either high, θ = θH , or low, θ = θL < θH . The outcome of each project yt
can be a success or a failure yt ∈ {S, F}. The probability of success is jointly
determined by the agent’s ability θ (which is assumed to be constant across
periods) and his choice of eﬀort:
Pr{yt = S | et} = etθ. (1)
Thus, ability and eﬀort are complements. Note also that not exerting eﬀort
induces failure with certainty. For simplicity, we assume that the eﬀort deci-
sion is observed by the principal; however, it is not observed by the the third
parties and therefore is non-contractible.3
In case of success, the agent receives a payoﬀ of V > 0 and the principal
gets W > 0. Failure yields nothing to both. The agent’s reservation utility
is normalized to 0.
At the end of each period, the principal can compensate the agent by
giving a discretionary bonus b ≥ 0. We assume that the budget is balanced,
so that the reward paid by the principal is equal to the reward obtained by
the agent. The discount factor is normalized to 1 for simplicity.
2.2 The main assumptions
We assume that neither the agent himself, nor the principal precisely know
the agent’s ability. This imperfect self-knowledge of the agent can arise
whenever he is facing a new task or when his retrospective evaluation of
past experiences is distorted (see e.g. Kahneman (1994)). Note that the
assumption that the agent does not know his ability is quite common in the
3See Section 6 for a brief analysis of more realistic cases where the principal does not
observe the agent’s eﬀort, and failure to exert eﬀort does not lead to failure with certainty.
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literature on labor contracts (e.g. as in Holmstrom’s (1999) career concerns
model).
Both the principal and the agent share the same prior beliefs about the
agent’s ability (which are common knowledge): they believe that with prob-
ability ρ the agent is talented (θ = θH) and with probability 1− ρ his ability
is low (θ = θL). Based on these prior beliefs, the agent forms an estimate of
his chances to succeed if he decides to exert eﬀort. This estimate, akin to
self-confidence, is simply
E[θ] = ρθH + (1− ρ)θL.
Clearly, self-confidence is increasing in the prior probability of being talented,
ρ. Sometimes, with some abuse of language, we shall equate ρ with the agent’s
initial self-confidence.
Although unable to observe the agent’s ability directly, the principal ob-
serves his performance yt at the end of period t. By contrast, we assume
that performance cannot be perfectly observed by the agent himself or by
any third party. There are many circumstances in which the principal may
be in a better position to estimate the agent’s performance than the agent
himself, a fact that is illustrated by the ubiquity of performance feedback
systems in organizations (Gibbs (1991)). A manager may often know better
how useful an employee’s work was for the firm, a professor may understand
better the quality of a student’s paper, etc. This is particularly true in sit-
uations where agents are in their learning phase: at school or at new jobs.
Other applications concern complex jobs, where each agent is responsible for
a tiny part of the final product and objective performance measures are fuzzy
measures of ability or eﬀort.
The agent does not directly observe his first-period performance y1, but
receives instead an (imperfectly) informative private signal σ ∈ (0, 1). This
signal has a conditional distribution depending on the first-period outcome
G(σ | y) = Gy(σ) and a continuous positive density g(σ | y) = gy(σ). The
realized signal σ is private information to the agent, but the conditional
distribution functions are common knowledge. We assume that a high signal
brings good news about the outcome. Formally,
Assumption 1 The likelihood ratio
l(σ) ≡ gS(σ)
gF (σ)
(2)
is continuous in σ and assumes all values in [0,+∞). Furthermore, the mono-
tone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) is satisfied: l(σ) is everywhere increas-
ing in σ.
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Neither the first- nor the second-period outcomes are observed by any
third party. It follows that a performance-contingent reward cannot be spec-
ified in a contract, because the agent or a third party would not be able to
verify the truthfulness of the principal’s claim. The non-contractibility is
one of the main departures from the model of Be´nabou and Tirole (2003): in
their model an outcome-contingent contract can be written. In practice, this
feature of non-contractibility is present in most jobs (Prendergast (1999)).
We also assume that the payoﬀ V that the agent receives in case of suc-
cess is suﬃciently high to motivate him to work even if he expects no bonus
to be paid, provided that the agent’s self-confidence (or feeling of compe-
tence) is high enough. The determination of the agent’s payoﬀ V is not
modelled explicitly, but can be thought of as the future discounted reward
from completing the task succesfully. For instance, being successful increases
the probability of finding a new job in the future, getting a promotion, ob-
taining useful skills or receiving peer recognition. On the other hand, it might
also represent the intrinsic motivation of an agent from performing well on a
task4. To make things interesting, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 Were the agent perfectly informed about his type, he would
undertake the task without a bonus if and only if he had high ability: θLV <
c < θHV.
2.3 Timing
Each period is divided into three stages. In the first stage of the first period,
the agent decides whether or not to exert eﬀort. In the second stage, the
outcome is realized and observed by the principal, while the agent receives his
private signal σ. In the third stage, the principal pays a bonus b. The second
period is identical, save for we omit the agent’s signal about his second-period
performance since it has no impact on the analysis.
3 Equilibrium analysis
In this section we analyze Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of the principal-
agent game. However, for a wide range of parameters there is a continuum
4In the words of Deci and Ryan [1985, 43] ”Intrinsic motivation is the innate, natu-
ral propensity to engage one’s interests and exercise one’s capacities, and in so doing, to
seek and conquer optimal challenges. Such motivation emerges spontaneously from in-
ternal tendencies and can motivate behavior even without the aid of extrinsic rewards or
environmental controls”.
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of perfect Bayesian equilibria in this game. This is a common feature of
signaling games. Rather than characterize the whole equilibrium set, we
shall impose some further restrictions. Indeed, some of the equilibria are
less reasonable than others, because out-of-equilibrium beliefs they stipulate
are less plausible. In characterizing the equilibrium we therefore apply a
standard refinement, Never a Weak Best Response (NWBR) refinement for
signaling games5. We also restrict attention to those equilibria, in which the
agent chooses to work if indiﬀerent.
3.1 Continuation equilibria
In this section we analyze equilibria of continuation ”subgames” starting
after the second stage of period 1, that is, after the agent has chosen his
first-period eﬀort.
The first thing to note is that no bonus is ever oﬀered to the agent in
period 2: paying a bonus is costly to the principal, and, since it can have
no impact on decisions made in the past, the principal should never give a
bonus at the final stage of the game. The agent, of course, foresees that no
bonus is given in period 2. Whether he exerts eﬀort in this period depends
on his posterior belief of being the high type, ρ0: the agent works in period
2 if and only if:
[ρ0θH + (1− ρ0)θL]V ≥ c. (3)
We have made two simplifying assumptions: first, the principal observes
the agent’s eﬀort and second, the low eﬀort leads to failure with certainty.
These assumptions are not crucial for the results (see Section 6), but make
the analysis more transparent.
Lemma 1 Assume first that the agent exerts low eﬀort at the first stage,
e1 = 0. In this case the principal does not pay a bonus, b1 = 0, and the agent
chooses to exert eﬀort in the second period if ρ ≥ ρ¯, where ρ¯ is determined
by
[ρ¯θH + (1− ρ¯)θL]V = c. (4)
Proof. In the subgame that follows e1 = 0 the agent gets no new in-
formation and chooses to exert eﬀort in the second period if his payoﬀ from
5See Cho and Kreps (1987) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a definition. The
refinement is somewhat stronger than the Intuitive Criterion and, in the current context,
is equivalent to the Banks and Sobel’s (1987) universal divinity criterion.
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working on the second project is non-negative, i.e. ρ ≥ ρ¯, where ρ¯ is deter-
mined by (4). The principal does not pay a bonus in the first period: she
has no private information to be communicated to the agent through costly
signaling, and a bonus has no impact on the agent’s incentives in the second
period.
We now proceed with the analysis of the more interesting case, the sub-
game that follows the agent’s choice to exert high eﬀort in the first period,
e1 = 1. This time, the agent’s posterior beliefs depend on the new informa-
tion he gets: the signal σ about the first-period outcome and the bonus b1
paid by the principal. Of course, what matters is not the bonus per se, but
its informational content. Suppose that the agent gets signal σ and bonus b1
that, he believes, is paid by the principal with probability xS after success
and with probability xF after failure. Then, the agent updates his belief on
being the high ability type from ρ to ρ0 with:
ρ0
1− ρ0 =
ρ
1− ρ
θHgS(σ)xS + (1− θH)gF (σ)xF
θLgS(σ)xS + (1− θL)gF (σ)xF
. (5)
The following lemma characterizes the agent’s optimal choice of second-
period eﬀort:
Lemma 2 Let e1 = 1. There exist threshold levels of the initial self-confidence
ρ˜S and ρ˜F ≥ ρ˜S such that in any continuation equilibrium:
(i) If ρ < ρ˜S, the agent chooses e2 = 0 after any signal σ and bonus b.
(ii) If ρ ≥ ρ˜F , the agent chooses e2 = 1 after any signal σ and bonus b.
(iii) If ρ ∈ [ρ˜S, ρ˜F ), works if and only if he gets suﬃciently good news (i.e.
signal σ exceeds a threshold level σ˜ that depends on ρ and bonus b1 received
in the first period).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark 1 A similar statement can be formulated in terms of the agent’s
cost of eﬀort c: there exist c˜S and c˜F ≤ c˜S such that the agent never works
if c > c˜S, always works if c ≤ c˜F and for c ∈ (c˜F , c˜S] works if and only if he
gets suﬃciently good news (σ high enough).
Indeed, if the agent has a suﬃciently low initial self-confidence ρ < ρ˜S
(or his cost of eﬀort c is high), it is optimal for him to shirk in the second
period even if he were sure that the first-period project had been successful:
this information would still be insuﬃcient to compensate for his initial pes-
simism. The signal σ about the outcome, as well as the bonus b1 paid by
the principal, are irrelevant for this range of parameters (this is part (i) of
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Lemma 2). Similarly, if the agent has suﬃciently high initial self-confidence
(or low disutility of eﬀort), the agent chooses to work in period 2 even if he
is sure that he has suﬀered a failure in the first task (part (ii) of Lemma 2).
The thresholds ρ˜S and ρ˜F are derived in the appendix. Their character-
ization is straightforward: ρ˜S is the level of the initial self-confidence that
makes the agent indiﬀerent between choosing e2 = 1 and e2 = 0 if he knows
that the first project has been successful, y1 = S. Similarly, ρ˜F is the level of
the initial self-confidence that makes him indiﬀerent if he learns that y1 = F .
For intermediate levels of initial self-confidence ρ ∈ [ρ˜S, ρ˜F ) (or cost of eﬀort
c ∈ (c˜F , c˜S]), were the agent to know the first-period outcome, it would be
optimal for him to work after success and to shirk after failure. Therefore,
within this range of parameters the agent’s reaction is sensitive to the news
he gets: if suﬃciently good news arrives (that is, high enough σ for a given
principal’s policy), he works in period 2. If he gets suﬃciently bad news, he
does not work in period 2. More precisely, in the appendix we show that the
agent chooses to work if signal σ exceeds σ˜ that satisfies
l(σ˜) =
xF
xS
A, (6)
where A is a compound parameter measuring task unattractiveness.6 This
parameter is decreasing in initial self-confidence and increasing in the cost
of eﬀort. Thus, the threshold signal σ˜ is decreasing in initial self-confidence
(for a given principal’s policy). Note, furthermore, that the threshold signal
is decreasing in the probability that the bonus is paid after a success (xS),
which makes it more likely that the outcome was a success, and increasing
in the probability that the bonus is paid after a failure (xF ), which makes it
more likely that the outcome was a failure.
Consider now the the principal’s behavior in period 1. For ρ /∈ [ρ˜S, ρ˜F ),
the principal gives no bonus in period 1, since she is not able to influence
the agent’s behavior in period 2. From here on, we focus on the intermediate
range of initial self-confidence ρ ∈ [ρ˜S, ρ˜F ). For these values of ρ, the agent’s
second-period behavior is sensitive to the information about the outcome of
the first period, and, therefore, the principal may try to signal through a
bonus that the agent was successful in period 1.
6
A :=
(1− ρ)(1− θL)(c− θLV )− ρ(1− θH)(θHV − c)
ρθH(θHV − c)− (1− ρ)θL(c− θLV )
.
For the values of ρ in the interval from ρ˜S to ρ˜F , A is equal to the ratio of the expected loss
from working in case of a failure to the expected gain from working in case of a success. In
the absence of any intermediate information the agent would work if and only if A(ρ) ≤ 1,
that is ρ ≥ ρ¯, where ρ¯ is defined in (4).
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The following lemma, that shows that in equilibrium a higher bonus in-
creases the likelihood of eﬀort, will prove to be helpful in deriving the equi-
librium bonus. Define σ˜(b) as the threshold signal such that the agent works
for all σ ≥ σ˜(b) after getting bonus b. Then:
Lemma 3 For any bonuses b1 > b2 oﬀered in equilibrium with positive prob-
ability it must be that σ˜(b1) < σ˜(b2).
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Suppose b1 > b2 are equilibrium
bonuses but σ˜(b1) ≥ σ˜(b2). Then a lower bonus b2 (weakly) increases the
likelihood of eﬀort. Clearly, this makes the principal unambiguously better
oﬀ giving b2 so that b1 can not be an equilibrium bonus.
We shall show that under our assumptions the continuation equilibrium
is (generically) unique: it is either pooling or semi-separating. In the pool-
ing equilibrium, the principal always oﬀers the same reward. In the semi-
separating equilibrium, she always oﬀers one reward after success, but ran-
domizes between this reward and another one after failure. To gain intuition,
we show the derivation of these two equilibria in detail in Subsections 3.1.1
and 3.1.2 before stating Proposition 1 that summarizes the analysis of con-
tinuation equilibria for the case e1 = 1.
3.1.1 Pooling equilibrium
We keep assuming throughout that the agent exerts eﬀort in period 1 and
that ρ ∈ [ρ˜S, ρ˜F ). We are now looking for a pooling equilibrium, in which the
principal gives the same bonus b˜ independent of the intermediate outcome.
Given this bonus, the agent only works for signals exceeding σ˜ > 0, where
l(σ˜) = A (see equation (6) with xS = xF = 1). Denote by θˆF and θˆS the
estimates of the agent’s ability by the principal, conditional on failure and
success in the first period respectively. Thus:
θˆy = E[θ | e1 = 1, y1 = y}. (7)
Formulas for these probabilities are given in the Appendix in the proof of
Proposition 1. The expected second-period equilibrium payoﬀ for the prin-
cipal is then given by:
E[UP2 | e1 = 1, y1 = y] = θˆy(1−Gy(σ˜))W − b˜. (8)
Assume that the principal deviates from the equilibrium strategy, and oﬀers
a bonus bˆ = b˜ + ε with ε > 0. For b˜ to be the equilibrium bonus such a
11
deviation should not be profitable for the principal. A necessary condition
for this is that the agent does not believe that bˆ is given only after success if
ε is small enough (otherwise, the principal could achieve an upward jump in
the probability of eﬀort at an infinitesimal cost by giving bˆ instead of b˜). Let
σˆ be the agent’s reaction to bonus bˆ which makes the principal indiﬀerent
between deviating or not after failure:
θˆF (1−GF (σ˜))W − b˜ = θˆF (1−GF (σˆ))W − bˆ. (9)
We shall now invoke the NWBR restriction on the agent’s out-of-equilibrium
beliefs, which stipulates that for the agent not to believe that bˆ is given only
after success, it must be the case that:
θˆS(1−GS(σ˜))W − b˜ ≥ θˆS(1−GS(σˆ))W − bˆ. (10)
In other words, if the principal is indiﬀerent between a bonus bˆ and b˜ after a
failure, he should not be better oﬀ with a bonus bˆ after a success. Combining
(9) and (10) yields:
θˆS(GS(σ˜)−GS(σˆ)) ≤ θˆF (GF (σ˜)−GF (σˆ)). (11)
Dividing both sides by σ˜− σˆ (note that by Lemma 3 σˆ is necessarily smaller
than σ˜ for a positive ε) and taking the limit ε → +0 one gets θˆSgS(σ˜) ≤
θˆFgF (σ˜) or:
l(σ˜) ≤ θˆF
θˆS
. (12)
Conversely, assume that (12) is satisfied and consider a possible deviation
bˆ = b˜+ ε. Since the MLRP implies that7:
GS(σ˜)−GS(σˆ)
GF (σ˜)−GF (σˆ)
< l(σ˜), (13)
for any σˆ < σ˜, condition (12) implies a strict version of inequality (10).
Then, according to NWBR, the agent has to believe in failure after receiving
out-of-equilibrium bonus bˆ and the principal has no incentive to deviate to
7To prove this (following Milgrom (1981)): suppose l(x) < l(z) ∀ z ∈ [x, y]. Then,
since l(z) ≡ gS(z)/gF (z), gF (z)l(x) < gS(z). This implies
R y
x
gF (z)l(x)dz <
R y
x
gS(z)dz.
Integration yields: l(x) < [GS(y)−GS(x)] / [GF (y)−GF (x)] . Similarly, for l(z) < l(y) ∀
z ∈ [x, y], it follows that [GS(y)−GS(x)] / [GF (y)−GF (x)] < l(y).
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a higher bonus. Similar reasoning shows that the principal does not want to
deviate to a slightly lower bonus if and only if
l(σ˜) ≥ θˆF
θˆS
. (14)
There are two cases now. Either both inequalities (12) and (14) are
satisfied simultaneously, which implies a restriction on parameters
A =
θˆF
θˆS
. (15)
In this case for any b˜ ∈ [0, b˜S] with b˜S = θˆF (1 − GF (σ˜S))W there exists a
pooling continuation equilibrium in which the principal gives b˜, the agent
works if σ ≥ σ˜ (with l(σ˜) = A) after the equilibrium bonus and never after
an out-of-equilibrium bonus.
In the generic case, if (15) is not satisfied, the only candidate for the pool-
ing equilibrium is the one with b˜ = 0. In this case the agent’s limited liability
prevents the principal from downward deviations. For the upward deviations
to be unprofitable, (12) must be satisfied, which implies a restriction on the
parameters:
A ≤ θˆF
θˆS
. (16)
Note that this condition is both necessary and suﬃcient for the existence
of some pooling equilibrium.
3.1.2 Semi-separating equilibrium
Consider now a semi-separating equilibrium where the principal oﬀers b˜S af-
ter success and randomizes between b˜S and b˜F after failure (with probabilities
x˜S and x˜F ). In this case, bonus b˜F is given only in case of failure and there-
fore perfectly reveals it. It follows that b˜F = 0, since there is no reason for
the principal to incur a cost for conveying a negative signal.
In equilibrium the principal must be indiﬀerent between b˜S and b˜F after
a failure (otherwise she would not be willing to mix):
θˆF (1−GF (σ˜S))W − b˜S = 0, (17)
where σ˜S is the threshold signal for which an agent works after a bonus
b˜S. Note that after b˜F = 0 the agent does not work (recall that θˆFV < c for
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ρ ∈ (ρS, ρF )) so the payoﬀ for the principal is zero. Condition (17) determines
the bonus b˜S.
Moreover, the principal should not want to deviate to any bonus above or
below b˜S. Following the same logic as in the pooling case above, the principal
indeed will not deviate if the agent believes a failure occurred after observing
a deviation from the equilibrium bonus. Suppose first that the principal
deviates to bˆS = b˜S − ε. NWBR assumption implies that if
θˆF (1−GF (σˆS))W − bˆS = 0, (18)
it must be that
θˆS(1−GS(σˆS))W − bˆS ≤ θˆS(1−GS(σ˜S))W − b˜S (19)
Again, if this inequality did not hold, the agent should believe that a success
has occurred by the NWBR assumption, such beliefs being incompatible with
the equilibrium.
Together, these conditions imply:
l(σ˜S) ≥
θˆF
θˆS
. (20)
(Recall that a deviation to a smaller bonus is considered, hence σˆ > σ˜).
Condition (20) implies that σ˜S > 0. Indeed, suppose σ˜S = 0. Then,
l(0) ≥ θˆF/θˆS > 0 — a contradiction to Assumption 2 which stipulates that the
likelihood ratio l(σ) is monotone and assumes all values in [0,+∞). Hence,
σ˜S > 0, so the agent does not always work after bonus b˜S. Then, the principal
should also not be willing to deviate to a (slightly) higher bonus bˆS = b˜S + ε
to separate the success outcome. Like in the case of pooling, this implies:
l(σ˜S) ≤
θˆF
θˆS
. (21)
Hence, combining (20) and (21) gives:
l(σ˜S) =
θˆF
θˆS
(22)
as the only possibility. According to (6), the agent’s reaction is given by
l(σ˜S) = x˜FA. (23)
Condition (22) determines σ˜S, (23) defines x˜F and (17) determines b˜S. Finally
note that conditions (22) and (23) imply that A ≥ θˆF/θˆS as x˜F ≤ 1.
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3.1.3 Rewards, self-confidence, and motivation
The following proposition summarizes the analysis of continuation equilibria
after e1 = 1:
8
Proposition 1 For ρ ∈ [ρ˜S, ρ˜F ) there always exists a (generically) unique9
continuation equilibrium after the agent has chosen e1 = 1, satisfying the
NWBR criterion. Furthermore, there exists a unique value of initial self-
confidence ρ∗, defined as the (unique) solution to A = θˆF/θˆS, such that:
(i) If ρ ∈ [ρ˜S, ρ∗), the unique continuation equilibrium is semi-separating:
the principal always gives a bonus b˜S = θˆF (1−GF (σ˜S))W after success
(x˜S = 1), and randomizes between b˜S and b˜F = 0 after failure with
probabilities x˜F =
l(σ˜)
A
and 1− x˜F respectively. After receiving bonus b˜S
the agent works if his signal σ exceeds the threshold σ˜S, determined by
l(σ˜S) =
θˆF
θˆS
; after getting no bonus the agent does not work: σ˜F = 1.
(ii) If ρ ∈ (ρ∗, ρ˜F ), the unique continuation equilibrium is pooling and no
bonus is ever given by the principal. The agent works if his signal
exceeds threshold σ˜ determined by l(σ˜) = A.
Remark 2 Proposition 1 can be re-stated in terms of disutility of eﬀort:
there exists a theshold value c∗ defined as the unique solution to A = θˆF/θˆS
such that the unique continuation equilibrium is pooling for c ∈ (c˜F , c∗) and
semi-separating for c ∈ (c∗, c˜S], with equilibrium strategies being the same as
those described in parts (ii) and (i) of Proposition 1 respectively.
That the unique continuation equilibrium for suﬃciently high initial self-
confidence or low disutility of eﬀort is a pooling equilibrium with no bonus
is quite intuitive. Indeed, for such parameters the theshold signal σ˜, which
makes the agent indiﬀerent between working or not in the second period
in the pooling equilibrium, is relatively low. Low signals are more likely
after failure (due to the MLRP assumption), so it is after failure that the
principal gains more from a marginal decrease in σ˜. According to the logic of
the NWBR refinement, this makes the agent intepret an (out-of-equilibrium)
increase in the bonus as coming from the principal who observed a failure,
8The proposition states the equilibrium conditions for values of ρ such that ρ ∈ [ρ˜S , ρ˜F ).
Recall that it was already established in Lemma 2 that for values of ρ /∈ [ρ˜S , ρ˜F ) no bonus
is ever oﬀered. For ρ < ρ˜S , σ˜ = 1 (the agent never works) and for ρ ≥ ρ˜F , σ˜ = 0 (the
agent always works).
9The equilibrium is unique unless θˆF /θˆS = A, in which case there is a continuum of
pooling equilibria.
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thus undermining the principal’s incentives to increase the bonus. In fact,
a decrease in bonus would signal to the agent that the principal observed a
success, but the agent’s limited liability prevents the principal from paying
negative bonuses.
A more interesting result of the proposition is, however, that there is
a region where the principal does give a positive bonus in (continuation)
equilibrium, and this bonus increases the agent’s self-confidence. In this
region, the agent is relatively unlikely to make eﬀorts in the second period, so,
were the principal to play a pooling strategy, the threshold σ˜ would be high.
High signals are more likely after success, and in this case it is a principal
who observed a success who would gain more from a marginal decrease in
σ˜. This time the agent would interpret an (out-of-equilibrium) increase in
bonus as a signal of success, thus destroying the pooling equilibrium. In this
case, by paying a positive bonus, the principal sends a costly credible signal
to the agent that a success has occurred.
Besides establishing the use of bonuses in equilibrium, this proposition
also rules out equilibria where good performance is completely separated from
bad performance.10 It may seem counterintuitive that even bad performance
would be rewarded, but there is considerable evidence that this often occurs
in practice (Prendergast (1999)). Supervisors are reluctant to diﬀerentiate
good from bad performance, resulting in a well documented compression of
ratings. Prendergast (1999) conjectured that a possible reason could be that
the supervisor avoids to discourage the agent by revealing poor performance
to him. A similar view is shared by Beer (1990) who notes that many people
are rated on the high side because managers ”...do not want to damage
an employee’s self esteem, thereby demotivating the employee...”11. This
interpretation fits well our result12.
Another important point is that for levels of initial self-confidence below
the threshold level ρ∗, the size of the reward b˜S is proportional to W . Intu-
itively, if the principal derives higher benefits from a success, a bonus of a
given size becomes relatively less costly, and the principal has to increase the
size of the bonus to keep it credible in equilibrium. This means that the agent
can be very glad to get even a seemingly negligible reward provided that it
is given by a principal that does not have too much interest in the agent’s
performance. An almost costless praise by a disinterested, but slightly al-
10This result relies on the assumption that ”really bad” signals exist, i.e. l(0) = 0.
There is an exception: the continuation equilibrium is separating if ρ = ρ˜S , i.e. on the set
of parameters of measure 0.
11Quoted in Gibbs (1991, p. 7).
12Another reason mentioned by Prendergast (1999, p. 30) is that it is simply an un-
pleasant task to oﬀer poor ratings to workers.
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truistic division manager may still be very pleasant and convincing. In such
a case it is not a reward per se that makes the agent happy but mostly its
informational content.
3.1.4 Comparative statics
Comparative statics with respect to ρ Proposition 1 identifies a unique
threshold ρ∗ such that when the initial self-confidence ρ crosses the threshold
value ρ∗, the equilibrium switches from the semi-separating to the pooling
regime. In the pooling regime the only relevant equilibrium parameter — the
probability that the agent works in the second period — increases with ρ.
Other comparative static results with respect to ρ are less clear-cut. For
example, the impact of ρ on the size and frequency of the positive bonus
is ambiguous. This is not surprising: the agent’s equilibrium strategy is
determined by the ratio r(ρ) = θˆF/θˆS which itself varies nonmonotonically
in ρ. At ρ = 0 and ρ = 1 this ratio equals unity (there is no uncertainty
about the agent’s ability and the intermediate outcome does not bring new
information). For intermediate values of ρ the principal’s estimate of the
agent’s ability is lower after observing a failure than after observing a success,
and consequently θˆF/θˆS is smaller than one. Its derivative
r0(ρ) =
(θH − θL)2(ρ2θ2H(1− θH)− (1− ρ)2θ2L(1− θL))
(ρ(1− θH) + (1− ρ)(1− θL))2(ρθ2H + (1− ρ)θ2L)2
.
is negative if ρ ∈ (0, ρr) and positive if ρ ∈ (ρr, 1), where ρr is determined by
ρr
1− ρr
=
θL
θH
r
1− θL
1− θH
.
Whether r(ρ) = θˆF/θˆS is decreasing or increasing (or both patterns take
place) for values of ρ ∈ [ρ˜S, ρ∗) depends on the specific parametrization of
the model.
If r0(ρ) > 0, the threshold σ˜ is increasing in intitial self confidence, ρ, as
well as the probability of a bonus after a failure, xF . The impact on the size
of the bonus after a success, b˜S, is ambiguous. If r
0(ρ) < 0, σ˜ is decreasing,
b˜S is increasing, but the impact on xF is ambiguous.
Comparative statics with respect to c The ratio of the agent’s ability
estimates θˆF/θˆS, does not depend on c. On the other hand, A, the measure
of task unattractiveness, is increasing in c. First, this implies that in the
pooling equilibrium the probability that the agent works in the second period
decreases in c. Second, an increase in the cost of eﬀort causes a switch
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in equilibrium regimes when c crosses the threshold c∗. In this case the
equilibrium bonus rises discontinuously from 0 to bS = θˆF (1 − GF (σ˜S))W.
Third, in the semi-separating regime the equilibrium value of the positive
bonus, bS, and the agent’s strategy, σ˜, do not depend on c, but the probability
that the principal gives a positive bonus bS after a failure, xF , decreases with
c. The agent is less likely to work in that case; therefore, the bonus must
provide a stronger positive feedback.
3.2 The first-period choice of eﬀort
We now proceed by characterizing the equilibria of the whole game, in par-
ticular, specifying the agent’s choice of eﬀort in the first period; continuation
equilibria following diﬀerent eﬀort choices have been described in the previ-
ous sections. Fix all parameters of the model but the initial self-confidence
ρ and denote R1 ⊂ [0, 1] the set of values of ρ for which there exists a PBE
(satisfying the NWBR refinement) in which the agent chooses e1 = 1. Simi-
larly, let let R0 ⊂ [0, 1] be the set of values of ρ for which there exists a PBE
(satisfying the NWBR refinement) in which the agent chooses e1 = 0.
Proposition 2 i) An equilibrium exists and is generically unique; in par-
ticular, R1∆R0 = (R1\R0) ∪ (R0\R1) is an open set everywhere dense on
[0, 1].
ii) [ρ¯, 1] ⊂ R1, where ρ¯ is defined as the (unique) solution of A(ρ) = 1.
iii) [0, ρ˜S) ⊂ R0.
iv) R1 ∩ [ρ˜S, ρ∗) 6= ∅.
Proposition 2 shows that there exists equilibrium in which the agent works
in the first period if he is suﬃciently optimistic. Since, as argued before, the
expected bonus may be nonmonotonic in ρ, the agent’s equilibrium choice
of eﬀort also need not be monotonic with respect to ρ (or, similarly, with
respect to c, the cost of eﬀort13); part iv) of Proposition 2 thus cannot be
strengthened, but at least is shows that the intersection of the two sets is
nonempty. These parameters not only directly aﬀect the agent’s intrinsic
benefit from working, but also aﬀect the probability that a bonus is given
after the first period and the size of the bonus.
We can now emphasize the dual role that rewards play in our model
(for those values of parameters under which the continuation equilibrium is
semi-separating). First of all, a reward paid by the principal at the inter-
mediate stage provides the agent with positive feedback and encourages him
13A statement, similar to Proposition 2, could be formulated in terms of cost of eﬀort
c; see also previous remarks concerning the classification of continuation equilibria.
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to continue. This eﬀect is purely informational in nature. It’s existence also
aﬀects the agent’s behaviour in period 1 because this information acquisition
is valuable: it allows the agent to make a better, more informed choice of
eﬀort in the second period. By exerting eﬀort in the first period, the agent
receives valuable information which he otherwise would not get. Secondly,
the agent foresees that a bonus is paid with positive probability provided he
chooses to exert eﬀort, which gives him an additional stimulus to work hard
in period 1. This is a traditional incentive eﬀect.
This second eﬀect provides a rational for giving feedback through the use
of rewards that are useful to the agent. Indeed, in the model we have been
assuming that discretionary rewards (bonuses) are simply monetary transfers
from the principal to the agent. However, the principal could give feedback
to the agent in many other ways, including burning money or wasting time,
as long as such actions were costly to her. But, since actions that have direct
benefits for the agent (i.e. various kinds of rewards) create an additional
incentive eﬀect, their use for providing feedback is more attractive.
4 Optimal performance measures
In the previous section we showed that even noncontractible bonuses may
occur in equilibrium, by their virtue of providing feedback. In addition, the
use of rewards created an additional, direct incentive eﬀect. We can stress
the point even further by showing that the desire to exploit the incentive
eﬀect may be a reason for the principal to obscure performance results in
the first place. That is, we show that the principal may prefer subjective
performance measures over performance measures that the principal and the
agent can agree on14. This result corresponds well to the common practice of
using monitoring systems that provide little information even though more
informative performance measures are available (Gibbs, (1991)).
Let us now assume that the principal can influence the precision of the
performance measure. She could, for instance, make the whole process more
transparent to the agent, employ co-workers as peer reviewers, or specify
the goals in more detail. To make things extreme, we assume that at the
beginning of the game the principal can commit herself to either one of the
following two situations: (i) a situation as before, in which the agent only
gets an imperfect signal about performance, or (ii) a situation in which
the performance is perfectly observable to the agent. We denote these two
14We still assume in this section that a third party cannot verify performance, even if
the principal and the agent can agree on the performance (cf. for instance Levin (2003),
section III).
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regimes by smoky performance measure (SPM) and transparent performance
measure (TPM) respectively. The choice of the performance measurement
system is observed by the agent before he decides on his first-period eﬀort.
It is fairly easy to show that in both situations the agent exerts eﬀort in
period 1 for lower levels of initial self-confidence (or higher levels of disutility
of eﬀort) than if he would receive no information at all. In both situations
he receives some information on his performance by exerting eﬀort in period
1. This information is valuable, as it enables him to form a better judgement
about his ability, allowing for a better eﬀort decision in period 2. On top of
this informational acquisition, by exerting eﬀort the agent may increase the
probability of receiving a bonus.
From the viewpoint of the principal, a comparison between the two situ-
ations turns out to be ambiguous. The prospect of receiving valuable infor-
mation gives incentives to the agent to exert eﬀort in period 1. This favours
making performance as transparent as possible. The downside of providing
the precise information is that it negatively aﬀects the equilibrium bonus:
the private information of the principal is precisely the reason that a bonus
occurs in equilibrium. In the extreme case when the principal makes per-
formance completely transparent (TPM), the agent rightly foresees that no
bonus will be given in equilibrium.
Note that the principal is always better oﬀ in the agent exerts eﬀort in
equilibrium, so that whenever an agent works in only one of the two regimes
the principal always prefers the regime in which the agent works. If the agent
exerts eﬀort in both regimes, it is easily seen that the principal prefers to have
a transparent performance measure available, as this saves her any signalling
costs. Which performance measurement system the principal chooses turns
out to depend on her payoﬀ from a success, W . The trade-oﬀ she makes is
between providing better information and giving direct incentives through
a bonus. Since the equilibrium bonus increases linearly in W , the direct
incentive eﬀect dominates the incentive eﬀect for high enough values of W
and is dominated for low values ofW . The following proposition and corollary
summarize this.
Let RP be the set of values of ρ such that given performance measure
P ∈ {T, S} (transparent and smoky, respectively) there exist a NWBR equi-
librium in which the agent exerts eﬀort in period 1; thus, RS = R1.
Proposition 3 There exist W ≤W such that
i) If W > W, RT ⊂ RS (and RT 6= RS).
ii) If W < W, RS ⊂ RT .
Corollary 1 For suﬃciently high values of W, there exist values of initial
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self-confidence for which the principal strictly prefers a smoky performance
measure to a transparent performance measure.
For W > W there exists a range of parameters15 such that the agent
does not exert eﬀort with a transparent performance measure but does exert
eﬀort with a smoky performance measure. The implication of this is that
hiding the intermediate performance from the agent may be a way to deal
with the otherwise non-contractible externality. Ex post rewards paid by the
principal for signaling purposes serve as an ex ante mechanism to motivate
the agent to work hard from the beginning.
5 The hidden costs of rewards
So far the focus has been on how noncontractible rewards stimulate moti-
vation. By contrast, the papers by Be´nabou and Tirole (2003) and Suvorov
(2003) study how rewards can decrease motivation. As argued earlier, an
important diﬀerence with their approach is that they consider contractually
specified performance-contingent bonuses. To sketch the argument: if a prin-
cipal observes that the agent has low ability, she also expects him to have
low self-confidence. She therefore proposes a high-powered contract which
specifies a high reward in case of success to motivate the agent anyway. This
makes the agent realize that he must be of low ability, which lowers his
self-confidence even further. Nevertheless, the external reward induces the
agent to exert eﬀort, but once rewards are withdrawn, the agent is no longer
motivated to work hard.
Those papers agree with the experimental evidence on this eﬀect. Deci et
al. (1999) survey the literature and find that such crowding-out of motivation
is confirmed by a meta-analysis of more than one hundred earlier studies. In
sum, there is a rich body of experiments showing that there are hidden costs
of rewards16.
How much motivation is crowded out depends to a great extent on the
nature of the reward (Deci and Ryan (1985)). For example, rewards contin-
gent on performance have an eﬀect on motivation, but the eﬀect of rewards
contingent on fulfilling the task are less profound. In line with the model in
this paper, no such eﬀect has been found in experiments where rewards were
not explicitly made contingent on performance in advance.
15An interval of initial self-confidence parameters ρ other parameters being fixed or an
interval of the cost parameters c.
16See also Kohn (1993), Deci and Ryan (1985), Frey (1997), and Frey and Jegen (2002).
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It may be possible to replicate the negative correlation between rewards
and self-confidence in a version of our model. In the model of section 2, the
principal has more to gain from rewarding an agent after a success. Thus,
after success she gives rewards more often making them good news for the
agent that raises his self-confidence. However, so far it has been assumed
that eﬀort and ability are complements, so that the principal indeed wants to
increase the agent’s self-confidence. When eﬀort and ability are substitutes,
a higher self-confidence becomes a bad thing from the principal’s viewpoint,
and the results of the model are reversed: the principal now has an incentive
to spend resources to signal a failure, hence reducing self-confidence and
encouraging more eﬀort. The reward upsets the agent, but urges him to work
harder in the second period. However, in some cases it may be unnatural
to assume that the principal gives rewards to the agent after failures — this
would have perverse ex ante eﬀects. It may be more likely that the principal
will exert costly eﬀort to explain (prove) to the agent that he failed in the
first period, or even undertake costly actions to punish the agent.
Consider the following stylized model: the agent has to perform a task
that has again only two possible outcomes, failure and success. The agent’s
payoﬀ is λV − ec, where λ = 1 in case of success and λ = 0 in case of
failure. As before, the agent’s ability can be θH with probability ρ or θL with
probability 1 − ρ; eﬀort e ∈ {0, 1}. We assume now that ability and eﬀort
are substitutes rather than complements: if the agent is very smart, he may
master the task without much eﬀort. If he is less gifted, he can compensate
the lack of ability by working harder.
Formally, the agent succeeds if θ + e ≥ ψ, where θL < ψ < θH < 1. As
before, we suppose that the agent does not know his ability. Thus, eﬀort
is suﬃcient for success, as is the high ability. Assume also that c < V so
that the low-ability agent would exert eﬀort were he to know that he cannot
succeed otherwise. The agent faces two identical tasks, but does not observe
the outcome of the first until both are finished, and again there is a principal
that observes the first outcome immediately and gets payoﬀ W after each
success of the agent.
If c > (1−ρ)V, the agent will choose not to exert eﬀort in the first period.
In this case, if the principal observes the agent’s failure in the first period, she
will choose to signal this and encourage the agent to exert eﬀort. Any action
with some positive cost to the principal will do — were the agent to succeed
in the first period, the principal would not want to spend any resources since
she would learn that the agent is strong and would be sure to get W in any
case.17 If, for some reason, the principal decides to signal a failure by giving
17The NWBR refinement does not allow to pin down a unique equilibrium due to the
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a positive reward to the agent, this bonus brings bad news to the agent but
persuades him to work hard. As in Be´nabou and Tirole (2003) and Suvorov
(2003), the bonus works as a short-term reinforcer but in the long run it
decreases the agent’s self-confidence.
6 Modifications of the basic model
In this section we briefly discuss what happens when two of the simplifying
assumptions we made are lifted, one in turn.
6.1 Unobservable eﬀort
First, we shall show that the main results do not change much if we make a
more standard assumption that the agent’s first-period eﬀort is not observed
by the principal. Indeed, the results for the continuation equilibria obtained
in Section 3.1 remain valid, with a qualification that they apply to the con-
tinuation equilibria that occur on the equilibrium path, where the principal
holds correct beliefs about the agent’s first period choice of eﬀort. However,
now the analysis must be also extended to out-of-equilibrium situations, in
which the agent deviates and chooses the first period eﬀort that is diﬀerent
from what is expected by the principal.
When parameters are such that the continuation equilibrium is semi-
separating, shirking becomes (weakly) more attractive than in the model
with observable eﬀort. Indeed, if the principal believes that the agent ex-
erted eﬀort, the agent may still count on getting a positive bonus with some
probability even if he shirks since the principal does not observe the devi-
ation. Similarly, if the principal believes that the agent shirks in the first
period, but the agent deviates and chooses to supply eﬀort, such a devia-
tion will not be detected and rewarded by the principal unless the project
succeeds (in which case the principal updates her beliefs about the agent’s
strategy). As a result, in the model with unobservable eﬀort there is a set of
parameters of a positive measure for which there are multiple equilibria, i.e.
statement (i) of Proposition 2 is no longer valid. That is, for a set of values
of ρ ∈ (ρ˜S, ρ∗) of a positive measure, there exist equilibria with e1 = 0 and
e1 = 1, as well as a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the agent random-
izes between the two eﬀort levels. Other statements of Proposition 2, as well
as those of Proposition 3 remain valid.
open set problem: any positive bonus convinces the agent that he failed and thus is weak.
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6.2 Positive probability of success under shirking
Another important assumption we made was that the low eﬀort leads to
failure with certainty. We now discuss what changes when this assumption
is lifted. Suppose that the model is as described in Section 2, save for now
the probability of success of the agent of ability θ that chooses e = 0 is given
by θk with some k ∈ (0, 1); we also assume that after he chooses e1 = 0,
the agent now gets signal σ that has the same distribution conditional on
success/failure as that of the signal arriving after he chooses e1 = 1. To
check the robustness of our findings, we will be particularly interested in the
limiting case of k ≈ 0. We keep assuming, as in the main model, that the
first period eﬀort is observed by the principal.
Now the continuation subgame that follows the choice of the low eﬀort
by the agent is qualitatively similar to the subgame that follows the choice of
high eﬀort. More specifically, Lemma 2 is now true for the case e1 = 0 with
thresholds ρ˜S and ρ˜F replaced by appropriate ρ˜S0 and ρ˜F0; one can check that
ρ˜S0 = ρ˜S and ρ˜F0 ∈ (ρ˜S, ρ˜F ). Proposition 1 now applies to the continuation
subgame after e1 = 0, with A, θˆF , θˆS and ρ∗ replaced by A0, θˆF0, θˆS0 and
ρ∗0. Once again we see that the role of bonuses in our framework is to give
credibility to communication, rather than to reward the agent’s eﬀort. Even
if the agent shirks, but is lucky in the first period, the principal wants to
give a reward: then, the agent learns that he has been lucky and, therefore,
probably has high ability, which makes it worthwhile to exert eﬀort on the
second stage.
It can be checked that in the limit, for k small enough, all the statements
of Propositions 2 and 3 are valid. Indeed, ρ˜F0 −→ ρ¯ when k −→ 0; hence,
for all ρ > ρ¯, in the limit when k −→ 0 the continuation equilibria after
the agent chooses e1 = 0 are pooling with no bonus oﬀered. In contrast, for
all ρ ∈ (ρ˜S, ρ¯) the continuation equilibria after the agent chooses e1 = 0 are
almost separating (i.e. x˜F0 −→ 0 when k −→ 0). Hence, for ρ ∈ (ρ˜S, ρ¯) the
shirking option may be quite attractive for the agent: he gets almost perfect
information from the principal. Thus, R1, the set of values of ρ for which in
equilibrium e1 = 1, contracts, while R0, the set of values of ρ for which in
equilibrium e1 = 0, expands, compared to the basic model with k = 0.
However, if k is small, the probability that the agent gets a bonus after
shirking is negligible. Thus, when ρ ∈ (ρ˜S, ρ¯), he faces the following tradeoﬀ:
to get (almost) perfect information by shirking or to get a bonus from the
principal with non-negligible probability by working. Clearly, the optimal
behavior depends on the equilibrium size of the reward: ifW is small enough,
the shirking option becomes more attractive, if W is large, the agent prefers
to work in the equilibrium.
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7 Conclusions
Studies by psychologists have shown that rewards can undermine motivation,
which stimulated economists to examine the eﬀects of rewards in more detail.
As Be´nabou and Tirole (2003), we focus on the role of self-confidence and
give a new explanation for the use of discretionary rewards and emphasize
their role in stimulating motivation.
Although we have framed our model as a principal-agent relationship
where the agent is uncertain about his performance, other settings are pos-
sible. For example, the agent could be unsure about his own payoﬀ or cost
of eﬀort rather than his ability. Another possibility is that the agent cares
about the principal’s payoﬀ (e.g. through altruism), but is unaware of how
much utility the principal derives from his eﬀort. Or the principal could be
more or less altruistic towards the agent and his generosity in the first period
could suggest that nice gifts are on the way if the agent also succeeds in the
second.
This paper is only one of the first few attempts to study formally the
interaction between rewards and self-confidence. Future work could gener-
alize some of the assumptions. One possible extension is to consider more
than two periods. This would shed light on the dynamics of rewards and
self-confidence like in Suvorov (2003). Will the rewards have to increase to
keep the agent motivated? Will the absence of a reward in a given period dis-
courage the agent more if some rewards were given before than if no rewards
were ever given?
Another extension would be to study an environment where both con-
tractually specified and discretionary rewards might be used and to see what
would be the optimal mix of them. For this, both subjective and objective
measures of performance should be available, as in Baker et. al. (1994) and
Pearce and Stacchetti (1998).
It would be also interesting to consider the model with several agents. For
example, two agents may simultaneously perform a similar task in the same
environment: their chances to succeed are perfectly correlated conditional on
the abilities and eﬀorts, abilities themselves being unknown and independent.
What will an agent infer when he is not rewarded but sees the colleague to
get a bonus? What will be the principal’s policy? We hope to give answers
to these questions in the future work.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. The agent chooses to work in the second period if
and only if inequality (3) is satisfied. It can be written as:
ρ0
1− ρ0 ≥
c− θLV
θHV − c
=: φ, (24)
where φ is the ratio of the expected loss of working for the low ability agent
to the expected gain of the high-ability agent. Suppose the agent gets signal
σ and bonus b1 that, he believes, is paid by the principal with probability xS
after success and with probability xF after failure. Then, the agent updates
his belief on being the high ability type from ρ to ρ0 given by (5). Substituting
(5) into (24), one finds that the agent works in the second period if:
(ρθH − (1− ρ)θLφ) l(σ)xS ≥ ((1− ρ)(1− θL)φ− ρ(1− θH)) xF . (25)
If ρ is smaller than ρ˜S determined by
ρ˜S
1− ρ˜S
=
θL
θH
φ, (26)
the LHS of (25) is non-positive, while the RHS is non-negative: the agent
chooses e2 = 0 irrespective of signal σ and the principal’s strategy xF , xS
(since at least one of xF , xS must be positive, the LHS is strictly smaller
than the RHS).
If ρ is larger than ρ˜F determined by
ρ˜F
1− ρ˜F
=
µ
1− θL
1− θH
¶
φ,
the LHS of (25) is non-negative, while the RHS is non-positive: the agent now
chooses e2 = 1 irrespective of signal σ and the principal’s strategy xF , xS.
It is easy to see that ρ˜S < ρ˜F . For ρ ∈ (ρ˜S, ρ˜F ), the inequality (25) can
be rewritten as
gS(σ)
gF (σ)
≥ xF
xS
A, (27)
where
A =
(1− ρ)(1− θL)φ− ρ(1− θH)
ρθH − (1− ρ)θLφ
. (28)
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For ρ ∈ (ρ˜S, ρ˜F ) the agent chooses e2 = 1 for any signal σ > σ˜ with:
gS(σ˜)
gF (σ˜)
=
xF
xS
A(ρ). (29)
Since by assumption gS(σ)/gF (σ) assumes all values in [0,+∞), the threshold
signal σ˜ ∈ [0, 1] always exists (it may be equal to 0 or 1). When ρ = ρ˜S, the
agent works only if he is sure that success has occured, that is if xF = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.
The estimates of the agent’s ability conditional on observing failure and
success in the first period are respectively:
θˆF =
ρ(1− θH)θH + (1− ρ)(1− θL)θL
ρ(1− θH) + (1− ρ)(1− θL)
, (30)
θˆS =
ρθ2H + (1− ρ)θ2L
ρθH + (1− ρ)θL
. (31)
Consider the task unattractiveness parameter A as a function of ρ, A(ρ).
Denote r(ρ) = θˆF/θˆS the ratio of the agent’s expected abilities after failure
and after success, again considered as function of ρ.
Lemma 4 There exists a unique ρ∗ such that A(ρ) = r(ρ). If ρ ∈ (ρ˜S, ρ∗),
then A(ρ) > r(ρ); if ρ ∈ (ρ∗, ρ˜F ), then A(ρ) < r(ρ).
Proof. Equation A(ρ) = r(ρ) is equvalent to
((1− ρ)(1− θL)φ− ρ(1− θH)) (ρ(1− θH) + (1− ρ)(1− θL))
¡
ρθ2H + (1− ρ)θ2L
¢
= (ρθH − (1− ρ)θLφ) (ρ(1− θH)θH + (1− ρ)(1− θL)θL) (ρθH + (1− ρ)θL) ,
or, dividing both sides by (1− ρ)3 and denoting α = ρ
1−ρ ,
((1− θL)φ− α(1− θH)) (α(1− θH) + (1− θL))
¡
αθ2H + θ
2
L
¢
(32)
= (αθH − θLφ) (α(1− θH)θH + (1− θL)θL) (αθH + θL) .
Denote by Q1(α) the LHS of this equation which is a cubic polynomial in
α with three real roots αL1 = − 1−θL1−θH ,α
L
2 = −
θ2L
θ2H
,αL3 =
1−θL
1−θH φ, it tends to
−∞ when α → +∞ and tends to +∞ when α → −∞. The RHS (which
we denote by Q2(α)) is a also cubic polynomial in α with three real roots
αR1 = −
³
1−θL
1−θH
´³
θL
θH
´
,αR2 = − θLθH ,α
R
3 =
θL
θH
φ; it tends to +∞ when α →
+∞ and tends to −∞ when α → −∞. Looking at the order of the roots
(αL1 < α
R
1 < α
R
2 < α
L
2 < α
R
3 < α
L
3 ), it can be easily seen that Q1(α)−Q2(α)
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changes sign on each of the intervals (αL1 ,α
R
1 ), (α
R
2 ,α
L
2 ) and (α
R
3 ,α
L
3 ), and
thus equation (32) has a solution on each of the intervals (in particular, we
have proven the existence of ρ∗ because αR3 =
ρ˜S
1−ρ˜S
and αL3 =
ρ˜F
1−ρ˜F
). Since
(32), as a cubic polynomial in α has at most three real roots, we have also
proven the uniqueness.
It only remains to prove now the (generic) uniqueness of the continuation
equilibrium. To prove it, we first get some intermediate results.
Lemma 5 If bonus b˜ is given in equilibrium with probability x˜S > 0 after
success and with x˜F > 0 after failure, and σ˜ is the agent’s reaction to the
bonus (i.e. the agent works if and only if he received a signal above σ˜), then
l(σ˜) = x˜F
x˜S
A and either
• b˜ > 0 and l(σ˜) = θˆF/θˆS or
• b˜ = 0 and l(σ˜) ≤ θˆF/θˆS.
Proof. The agent’s optimal reaction σ˜ to the principal’s policy is deter-
mined by l(σ˜) = x˜F
x˜S
A unless the agent would find it worthwhile to always
work when oﬀered b˜, i.e. σ˜ = 0. In the latter case we should have l(0) ≥ x˜F
x˜S
A
in contradiction with Assumption 1 which states l(0) = 0.
When b˜ > 0, for the principal not to be able (and a fortiori willing) to
signal that the agent has succeeded in period 1 by deviating to b˜ ± ε for a
small ε > 0, it must be the case that l(σ˜) = r(ρ) (see the analysis of the
pooling equilibrium in section 3.1.1). When b˜ = 0, only deviations to b˜ + ε
are relevant so the requirement reduces to l(σ˜) ≤ θˆF/θˆS.
Lemma 6 In equilibrium only one bonus is oﬀered after success.
Proof. Assume that b1 and b2 > b1 are oﬀered after success with positive
probability, and σ˜1 and σ˜2 are the corresponding agent’s reactions (σ˜1 > σ˜2
by Lemma 3). The smaller bonus, b1, must be oﬀered after failure with a
positive probability (otherwise the agent would always work after b1 and the
principal would never give the larger one, b2). For the principal not to be
willing to separate the successful outcome by oﬀering b1+ ε, it must be that
l(σ˜1) ≤ θˆF/θˆS. Then,
b2 − b1 =
h
θˆS(GS(σ˜1)−GS(σ˜2))
i
W <
h
θˆF (GF (σ˜1)−GF (σ˜2))
i
W. (33)
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The equality in (33) comes from the principal’s indiﬀerence between b1 and
b2, and the inequality follows from l(σ˜1) ≤ θˆF/θˆS and MLRP18 and implies
that the principal strictly prefers to give b2 rather than b1 after a failure — a
contradiction.
Corollary 2 At most two diﬀerent bonuses are oﬀered with positive proba-
bility in equilibrium. There are three potential types of equilibrium:
A. pooling — the same bonus oﬀered to both types;
B. semi-separating — the principal always gives b˜S after success and ran-
domizes between b˜S and b˜F 6= b˜S after failure;
C. separating — the principal always gives b˜S after success and b˜F 6= b˜S
after failure.
Lemma 7 There are no separating continuation equilibria.
Proof. In a separating equilibrium the principal gives b˜F = 0 after a
failure (there is no sense to incur any cost to send a negative signal) and
b˜S > 0 after success. The agent always works after b˜S and never works after
b˜F . For this pair of bonuses to be an equilibrium, the principal should not
strictly prefer to give b˜S after failure:
θˆFW − b˜S ≤ 0. (34)
If (34) were a strict inequality, then the principal could reduce b˜S by a small ε
so that (34) would still be satisfied and according to he NWBR criterion the
agent should believe success has occurred: the set of the agent’s reactions that
make the principal indiﬀerent between giving 0 and b˜S − ε after failure — the
empty set — is strictly included in the set of reactions that make her indiﬀerent
between b˜S and b˜S − ε after success. Hence, b˜S is uniquely determined:
b˜S = θˆFW. (35)
It must also be the case that the principal cannot separate the success out-
come by a bonus lower than b˜S. The necessary and suﬃcient condition for
this is
l(0) ≥ θˆF
θˆS
. (36)
18MLRP implies
GS(σ˜1)−GS(σ˜2)
GF (σ˜1)−GF (σ˜2)
< l(σ˜1).
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To see this, assume that the agent’s reaction σˆ to an out-of-equilibrium bonus
bˆ is such that the principal is indiﬀerent between deviating to bˆ after a failure
or not:
θˆF (1−GF (σˆ))W − bˆ = 0. (37)
Then we need the principal not to be willing to deviate after success:
θˆS(1−GS(σˆ))W − bˆ < θˆSW − b˜S, (38)
or, using b˜S = θˆFW
θˆSGS(σˆ) > θˆFGF (σˆ). (39)
For (39) to be satisfied for all σˆ, a necessary and suﬃcient condition is (36).
Since l(0) = 0, this can be ruled out.
Thus, we see that for ρ ∈ (ρ˜S, ρ∗) there exists a unique continuation
that is semi-separating; for ρ ∈ (ρ∗, ρ˜F ) there exists a unique continuation
equilibrium that is pooling with no bonus being paid after both outcomes.
The only exception occurs when ρ = ρ∗, i.e. θˆF/θˆS = A(ρ): in this non-
generic case there is a continuum of pooling equilibria with the range of
possible bonuses [0, b˜S] with b˜S = θˆF (1−GF (σ˜S))W .
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let the continuation equilibrium (satisfying NWBR) be characterized by
bonus b˜S that the principal pays after success and, with probability x˜F , after
failure, and by the agent’s reaction σ˜ to this bonus. Note that both pooling
equilibria (with x˜F = 1) and semi-separating equilibria (with x˜F < 1) fit
this characterization. Equilibrium values of these parameters are given in
Proposition 1 for the case ρ ∈ (ρ˜S, ρ˜F ); for ρ /∈ (ρ˜S, ρ˜F ) bonus b˜S = 0, x˜F = 1
and σ˜ is irrelevant. The agent weakly prefers to work in the first period if
ρ[(θHV − c) (1 + θH(1−GS(σ˜)) + (1− θH)xF (1−GF (σ˜))) (40)
+bS(θH + xF (1− θH))]
≥ (1− ρ) [(c− θLV ) (1 + θL(1−GS(σ˜)) + (1− θL)xF (1−GF (σ˜)))
−bS(θL + xF (1− θL))],
and is indiﬀerent between working and shirking if (40) is satisfied as an
equality. Indeed, the left-hand side gives the expected gain from working for
the high ability agent whereas the right-hand side gives the loss from working
for the low ability one.
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If ρ > ρ∗, the unique continuation equilibrium satisfying NWBR is pool-
ing with no bonus ever oﬀered: b˜S = 0, x˜F = 1. The agent’s reaction σ˜ is
characterized by l(σ˜) = A when ρ ∈ (ρ∗, ρ˜F ) and σ˜ = 0 for ρ ∈ [ρ˜F , 1].
Let ρ¯ be such that
ρ¯
1− ρ¯ = φ,
or, equivalently, A(ρ¯) = 1. Then,
ρ
1− ρ > φ (41)
for all ρ ≥ ρ¯. Note that A(ρ∗) = r(ρ∗) < 1, therefore ρ∗ > ρ¯, and equilibria
for ρ ∈ [ρ¯, ρ∗) are semi-separating. Besides, one can easily check that MLRP
implies that
1 + θH(1−GS(σ˜)) + (1− θH)x˜F (1−GF (σ˜))
1 + θL(1−GS(σ˜)) + (1− θL)x˜F (1−GF (σ˜))
> 1. (42)
From (41) and (42) it follows that (40) is satisfied for all ρ ≥ ρ¯, which proves
part ii) of the Proposition19, and, also, part iv) since ρ¯ < ρ∗.
If ρ < ρ˜S, the unique continuation equilibrium is pooling with no bonus
oﬀered and the agent exerting no eﬀort in the second period. Then, (40)
reduces to
ρ
1− ρ ≥ φ
which is not satisfied for any ρ < ρ˜S since, as can be easily seen, ρ˜S < ρ¯.
This proves part iii) of the Proposition.
Existence of equilibrium has been proved by construction: when (40) is
satisfied as a strict inequality, there exists an equilibrium with e1 = 1; if
(40) is not satisfied at all, there exists an equilibrium with e1 = 0; finally, if
(40) is satisfied as equality, both equilibria exist: one with e1 = 0 and the
other with e1 = 1. Also note that the equilibrium (satisfying NWBR) will
be unique, unless ρ ∈ {ρ˜S, ρ∗, ρ˜F} or (40) is satisfied as equality. Clearly,
parameter values for which none of these exceptions takes place, constitute
an open and everywhere dense set in the manifold of admissible parameter
values, so part i) is proven.
Proof of Proposition 3.
19When ρ = ρ∗, there is a continuum of pooling continuation equilibria, but the proof
goes through for each of them.
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We shall first characterize the setRT . First, note that (0, ρ˜S)∩RT = ∅ and
[ρ˜F , 1) ⊂ RT — in these regions the agent does not care about information
about the first-period outcome. When ρ ∈ [ρ˜S, ρ˜F ), if the agent decides
to work in the first period in the TPM regime, the optimal strategy is to
continue working in the second if the first project is successful and to switch
to shirking if the project fails. Therefore, for these intermediate values of ρ
it is optimal to work in the first period if ρ ≥ ρ¯T , where
ρ¯T
1− ρ¯T =
1 + θL
1 + θH
φ.
Thus, [ρ˜S, ρ˜F ) ∩RT = [ρ¯T , ρ˜F ). Note that ρ˜S < ρ¯T < ρ¯ < ρ∗.
For any ρ ∈ (ρ˜S, ρ∗), (40) is satisfied if W is large enough (since b˜S is a
linear increasing function of W and the other terms in (40) do not depend
on W ), which prooves part (i) of the Proposition.
To prove part (ii), assume that ρ < ρ¯T . Then it can be easily checked
that
ρ(θHV − c)(1 + θH(1−GS(σ˜)) + (1− θH)xF (1−GF (σ˜)))
< (1− ρ)(c− θLV )(1 + θL(1−GS(σ˜)) + (1− θL)xF (1−GF (σ˜))),
which implies that (40) is not satisfied for W small enough and ρ /∈ R1 for
these values of W .
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